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People often favor members of their own group, while discrimi-
nating against members of other groups. Such in-group favoritism
has been shown to play an important role in human cooperation.
However, in the face of changing conﬂicts and shifting alliances, it
is essential for group identities to be ﬂexible. Using the dictator
game from behavioral economics, we demonstrate the remodeling
of group identities among supporters of Democratic presidential
candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. After Clinton’s
concession in June 2008, Democrats were more generous toward
supporters of their own preferred candidate than to supporters of
the other Democratic candidate. The bias observed in June per-
sisted into August, and disappeared only in early September after
the Democratic National Convention. We also observe a strong
gender effect, with bias both appearing and subsiding among men
only. This experimental study illustrates a dynamic change in bias,
tracking the realignment of real world conﬂict lines and public
efforts to reconstitute group identity. The change in salient group
identitywedescribeherelikelycontributedtothevictoryofBarack
Obama in the 2008 presidential election.
dictator game  economic games  evolution of cooperation 
Barack Obama  gender differences
I
n-group favoritism, or solidarity, is a well documented aspect
of human behavior (1–5, 49). People give members of their
owngrouppreferentialtreatment,andoftendiscriminateagainst
members of other groups. Economic games are particularly well
suited for measuring this solidarity, because they make express-
ing in-group favoritism costly (3–9). In the dictator game (10),
for instance, subjects divide a resource between themselves and
an anonymous recipient. To measure in-group favoritism, the
recipient is identified as either a member of the subject’s own
group or a different group. On average, people give more to
members of their group. This is true for both trivial groupings,
such as a preference for the paintings of Klee or Kandinsky (5),
and more meaningful groupings, such as political affiliation (4)
or ethnicity (8). Similarly, people are more willing to help others
with whom they share incidental similarities, such as birthdays or
first names (11).
Several explanations for the evolution of in-group favoritism
have been proposed. One such explanation is based on conflict
between groups (12). Within a group, selection will disfavor both
altruism toward in-group members and hostility toward out-
group members, because these behaviors are costly. However,
groups whose members engage in these solidaristic actions can
out-compete groups that do not. Thus, group-level selection
favoring solidarity can outweigh within-group selection against
it (13–18, 50).
Another possibility for the evolution of in-group favoritism
involves reciprocity heuristics (3, 19). Reciprocal altruism can
promote cooperation if interactions are repeated (20–28). This
isbecauseanaltruisticactcanlaterbereciprocated,eitherbythe
same interaction partner (direct reciprocity) or a different
individual (indirect reciprocity). Reciprocal altruism is only
beneficial if the probability of a subsequent interaction is
sufficiently large. However, in many situations, this probability
might be difficult to assess. Heuristics can help offset this lack of
information by providing guidelines for when it is favorable to
cooperate (29, 30). Given that future interactions are more likely
with in-group members than out-group members, it could there-
fore be an advantageous heuristic to preferentially cooperate
with in-group members.
Whatever the mechanism for the evolution of in-group favor-
itism might have been, a flexible sense of group identity is
essential. Many foraging societies display fission-fusion dynam-
ics, in which group composition changes regularly as groups
splinter and rejoin (31). Neighboring groups might battle each
other over access to resources, but need to join forces when
attacked by a powerful third group. Shifting coalitions can
change frequent trading partners into outcasts, and foreigners
into friends. Therefore, the ability to dynamically reform group
identity at the individual level is an essential part of either
evolutionary rationale. Despite related discussions in the psy-
chological literature (32), reformation of individual-level group
identity in response to new challenges has not yet been discussed
in an evolutionary context, nor explored experimentally using
incentivized economic games. Here, we investigate dynamic
group remodeling in the context of the 2008 Democratic Party
primary election.
In this field study, 395 Democrats were recruited from public
spaces in Cambridge, MA to act as dictators in a modified
dictator game. Subjects first indicated their preferred candidate
in the Democratic primary, Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton.
Each subject was then given $6 to divide between herself and an
anonymous recipient who supported either the same candidate
or the other Democratic candidate. We doubled each dollar that
subjects chose to give away so as to increase the average transfer
and thereby increase the resolution of our bias measurements.
The doubling factor also reflects the non-zero-sum aspect of
cooperationascommonlydefinedinevolutionarybiology,where
one pays a cost c to give a benefit b to another, with b  c (33).
Recipients received no money other than what was given to
them, and had no chance to respond or affect the outcome of the
game. Our setup allows us to ask whether Democrats showed
in-group bias by tending to give more to supporters of the same
candidate than to supporters of the other Democratic candidate.
To address changes over time, data were collected in 3 rounds:
June 10–18 (n  117), immediately after Hillary Clinton’s June
Authorcontributions:D.G.R.,T.P.,A.D.,R.W.S.,N.C.W.,andY.B.designedresearch;D.G.R.,
T.P., A.D., R.W.S., N.C.W., and Y.B. performed research; D.G.R. and T.P. analyzed data; and
D.G.R. and T.P. wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
Freely available online through the PNAS open access option.
1D.G.R. and T.P. contributed equally to this work.
2To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: drand@fas.harvard.edu.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/
0811552106/DCSupplemental.
www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.0811552106 PNAS  April 14, 2009  vol. 106  no. 15  6187–6191
P
O
L
I
T
I
C
A
L
S
C
I
E
N
C
E
S
E
V
O
L
U
T
I
O
N7 concession speech; August 9–14 (n  114), preceding the
August 25 start of the Democratic National Convention (DNC);
and September 2–5 (n  164), after the August 28 end of the
DNC. Our data allow us to ask whether in-group bias existed
among Democrats at the end of the primary season, and how this
bias was transformed over time by the changing nature of the
electoral conflict. For further details, see Materials and Methods.
Results
In June, men gave significantly more to supporters of the
candidate they also supported than to supporters of the other
Democraticcandidate(Fig.1A;1-tailedWilcoxonrank-sum,P
0.037). This in-group bias among men persisted into August and
the run-up to the DNC (Fig. 1B; 1-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum,
P  0.007). However, after the DNC, in-group bias was not
observed in early September (Fig. 1C; 1-tailed Wilcoxon rank-
sum, P  0.26). Women did not display significant in-group
favoritism during any of the sampling periods (1-tailed Wilcoxon
rank-sum, June P  0.13, August P  0.74, September P  0.41).
Although older female Clinton supporters were particularly
outspoken in their opposition to Barack Obama, we see no
significant in-group favoritism among women even if we restrict
our analysis to female Clinton supporters 30 years of age
(1-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, P  0.37) or 40 years of age
(1-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, P  0.58).
Our results emphasize that group identities are flexible and
can change over time. Significant in-group bias existed in June,
because the Obama versus Clinton conflict was still salient. That
this bias carried on into mid-August suggests that the absence of
actual electoral conflict was insufficient to alter Democrats’
perception of the salient grouping. The symbolic emphasis
placed on party unity during the DNC may have been one
important reason for the disappearance of Democratic in-group
bias. Other changes in the political landscape, such as the
Republican National Convention and the announcement of
Sarah Palin as Republican vice presidential candidate, might
have contributed as well.
The gender effect we observe is remarkable, because most
previous dictator game studies have found no gender differences
in bias with, for example, minimal groups (5), ethnic groups (8)
or, most pertinent to the present experiment, political affiliation
groups (4). Our results are consistent, however, with studies
finding that men have a stronger response than women to
intergroup competition (34, 35), and a greater tendency to seek
dominance over other groups (36, 37). It has also been reported
that men showed in-group bias based on ethnicity in a trust game
(38) and based on religiosity in a common-pool-resource di-
lemma (39) whereas women did not; that men were sensitive to
reciprocity concerns whereas women were not (44); and that
boys developed in-group bias between the ages of 3 and 8 years
whereas girls did not (40). Furthermore, we replicate this
male-onlygendereffectinasecondsimilarstudy,whichmatched
Democrats with other Democrats or Republicans (see SI). The
extreme salience of gender in the 2008 election, because of the
presence of a female candidate, may help to explain why we
observe a gender difference in bias based on political affiliation,
whereas ref. 4 found no such gender difference during the 2004
election cycle. Further study is needed to clarify the relationship
between gender and in-group favoritism.
To explore possible differences between Obama and Clinton
supporters, we examine preconvention and postconvention
transfer choices for supporters of each candidate separately (Fig.
2). The same effect is evident among supporters of both candi-
dates: significant in-group bias existed among men before the
DNC (1-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, Obama males P  0.022,
Obama females P  0.53, Clinton males P  0.003, Clinton
females P  0.25), whereas no significant bias existed after the
DNC (1-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, Obama males P  0.07,
Obama females P  0.37, Clinton males P  0.72, Clinton
females P  0.54).
Furthermore, Fig. 2 allows a comparison of the level of bias
among Obama and Clinton supporters. There is no significant
Fig. 1. Signiﬁcant in-group favoritism exists among men in June (A) and
August(B),butnotSeptember(C).Averagetransfertosupportersofthesame
candidate (In-group transfers, blue) and supporters of the other candidate
(out-group transfers, red) are shown. Male Democrats transferred signiﬁ-
cantly more to in-group members before the DNC compared with after the
DNC (2-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, P  0.013). There was no signiﬁcant pre-
DNC vs. post-DNC difference, however, in the amount transferred by male
Democrats to out-group members (2-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, P  0.78). P
valuesdisplayedintheﬁgureweredeterminedby1-tailedWilcoxonrank-sum
tests. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
6188  www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.0811552106 Rand et al.difference in transfers to in-group members among men before
the DNC (Obama to Obama: $3.18, Clinton to Clinton: $2.92;
2-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, P  0.72). However, there is a
significant difference in male pre-DNC transfers to out-group
members (Obama to Clinton: $1.88, Clinton to Obama: $0.77,
2-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, P  0.027). This suggests that in
June and August, Clinton supporters were more biased against
Obama supporters than vice versa. Although the evidence for
this asymmetry is not conclusive, it seems plausible that threat-
ened groups may exhibit more intense in-group bias than suc-
cessful groups. This issue requires further study.
Discussion
Barack Obama’s victory in the 2008 presidential election relied
in part on the support of voters who favored Hillary Clinton in
the Democratic primary. In the year preceding the presidential
election, the Democratic Party was deeply divided by a long,
bitter primary season. There was speculation that many Clinton
supporters, angered by her defeat, would break with the Dem-
ocratic Party and vote against Obama in the general election.
Therefore, unifying the party by reducing the antagonism be-
tween Obama and Clinton supporters was a major goal of
Democratic leaders after Clinton’s concession. To achieve this,
thegroupidentitiesthatweresalientduringtheprimary(Obama
supporter and Clinton supporter) had to be replaced, with
supporters of both candidates considering themselves
Democrats.
Here, we have demonstrated this remodeling of group identity
among supporters of Democratic presidential candidates Barack
Obama and Hillary Clinton using economic games. In-group
favoritism existed in male Democrats after Clinton’s concession
in June, persisted into August, and then disappeared after the
Democratic National Convention. It is not clear that this lack of
in-group bias translated into voting patterns in the 2008 general
election, or that our observations were representative of Dem-
ocrats outside of Cambridge, MA. We report changing attitudes
toward supporters of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, as
opposed to feelings about (or actual votes for) the candidates
themselves. Nevertheless, national polls indicate a large increase
in support for Obama among Clinton supporters immediately
after the DNC (41), which is broadly consistent with our
observations.Moreover,theoutcomeofthepresidentialelection
shows that Obama was able to gain broad support in key states
where voters had favored Clinton in the primary, such as
Pennsylvania and Ohio.
Although the 2008 Democratic primary was unusually bitter,
all of the subjects in our study were, nonetheless, supporters of
the same political party who shared similar ideological beliefs. It
is thus not clear how the flexible nature of group identity that we
observe translates to more dissimilar and deep-rooted group-
ings, such as ethnicity or religion. However, the historical record
shows many cases of disparate groups uniting in the face of a
common enemy, for example (42, 43). The extent and rate at
which such deeper and more conflict-ridden group identities can
be remodeled is of practical importance for understanding
Fig. 2. The same pattern of changing in-group favoritism exists among supporters of Barak Obama and Hillary Clinton. Signiﬁcant in-group bias exists before
the Democratic National Convention (June and August data aggregated) among male Obama supporters (A) and male Clinton supporters (C). There is no
signiﬁcant in-group bias after the DNC among either Obama supporters (B) or Clinton supporters (D). Comparing the level of pre-DNC bias, there is some
indication that Clinton supporters discriminated more than Obama supporters. There is no signiﬁcant difference in transfers to in-group members among men
before the DNC (Obama to Obama: $3.18, Clinton to Clinton: $2.92; 2-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, P  0.72). However, there is a signiﬁcant difference in male
pre-DNC transfers to out-group members (Obama to Clinton: $1.88, Clinton to Obama: $0.77, 2-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum, P  0.027). P values displayed in the
ﬁgure are determined by 1-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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Ncontemporary conflicts. The degree to which these effects could
be identified and measured through experimental economic
games should be explored in the future.
Our study suggests that economic games such as the dictator
game offer a potentially powerful tool for assessing political
preferences. As in prediction markets (44), the financial incen-
tives in these games may help reduce the tendency for politically
correct ‘‘cheap talk,’’ such as the hypothesized Bradley effect
(45), that is observed in traditional polling methods. Further
studies exploring the promise of economic games for predicting
political outcomes are needed.
An interesting aspect of solidarity revealed by our study is that
after the DNC, in-group transfers among men decreased, as
opposed to out-group transfers increasing. Previous studies
suggest that on average women give more than men in the
standard dictator game (46). Together with this observation, our
resultssuggestthatin-groupfavoritismincreasedaltruisticgiving
among males within the group, rather than decreasing altruistic
giving to out-group members. This implies that positive feelings
toward in-group members (i.e., ‘‘in-group love’’) were the mo-
tivation for in-group bias in our study, as opposed to negative
feelings toward out-group members (i.e., ‘‘out-group hatred’’)
(47–49).
Both the gender effect and the increasing within-group co-
operation in times of conflict may also shed light on the possible
evolutionary roots of in-group favoritism. The fact that only men
showed bias could be consistent with either evolutionary expla-
nation. However, the mobilization of resources when confronted
by an enemy, followed by a poststruggle demobilization, seems
more consistent with an evolutionary rationale based on inter-
group conflict than on reciprocity heuristics. Nevertheless, the
precise mechanisms for evolution of in-group favoritism remain
uncertain.Theoriginsofsolidarityandtheroleofdynamicgroup
membership in the evolution of cooperation and in-group fa-
voritism merit further empirical and theoretical study.
Materials and Methods
Between June 10 and Sept 5 2008, 395 Democrats were recruited from public
spaces in Cambridge, MA to participate as dictators in a 1-shot modiﬁed
dictatorgame(DG)(10).Theaverageparticipantagewas30.3years,and58%
were female. Another 395 Democrats were recruited in a similar way to act as
recipients in the dictator game.
AfteridentifyingthemselvesassupportersoftheDemocraticParty,subjects
indicated their preference for Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton during the
Democratic primary. Each subject then participated in a modiﬁed dictator
game in which she chose how to divides six $1 bills between herself (the
dictator) and an anonymous other who was recruited at a later time (the
recipient). The interaction was framed in neutral language, with the dictator
referred to as ‘‘you’’ and the recipient as ‘‘the other person.’’ The only
information the dictator received about the recipient was which candidate
the recipient supported during the Democratic primary (Obama or Clinton).
Dictatorswereshownphotographsofthecandidatesupportedbythedictator
and the candidate supported by the recipient. Each dictator was given an
envelopemarked‘‘You,’’inwhichtheyputthemoneytheychosetokeep,and
an envelope marked ‘‘Other Person’’ in which they put any money they chose
to give away. The dictator was informed that any money put in the ‘‘Other
Person’’ envelope would be doubled by the experimenters after the session,
and then given to a recipient.
We chose to double any money given away by the dictator to increase the
average transfer by providing an added incentive to give. In addition to
altruism(caringaboutincreasingtheother’spayoff),dictatorsmightalsogive
out of a concern for efﬁciency (maximizing the total payoff of both players).
Although this means that we cannot quantitatively compare the results from
this setup with a standard dictator game, the nature of the bias we observe
remains the same. It might be argued that there is an interaction between
efﬁciency concerns and in-group bias, such that people care more about
efﬁciencywheninteractingwithin-groupmemberscomparedwithout-group
members. However, such an interaction would tend to amplify the effects of
bias by creating an even greater difference between in-group and out-group
transfers. Thus, a decrease in bias using this design is even more compelling
than in a standard dictator game.
In addition to making a decision in the modiﬁed dictator game, subjects
reportedtheirageandgender.SampleinstructionsareincludedintheSI.Each
subject participated only once, was paired with only 1 recipient (either a
supporter of Obama or Clinton), and did not know that the other conditions
existed. This between-subject design minimizes the possibility of an experi-
menter demand effect for in-group bias.
Toaddresschangesovertime,datawerecollectedin3rounds:June10–18,
immediately after Hillary Clinton’s June 7 concession speech; August 7–14,
preceding the August 25 start of the Democratic National Convention (DNC);
and September 2–5, after the August 28 end of the DNC.
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